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STATE OF iFTAH

WANDA MAUREEN PETERSONf

:

Plaintiff-Appellant,

:
Case No. 20023

vs.
mcgNSL

Lm PEEERSCN,

.

Defendant-Respondent.

:

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
•i vi ] proceeding involving the modification or a Jivorce
decree.
DISPOSITION OF THh i^h L<* I'MB uumk

JOUKT

Subsequent ro tr*p entry of a Decree of Divorce in the Fourth
Judicial District Court of utan Count*/, defendant initiated an Order to
Shew Cause hea

*

plaintiff pay a portion y uxe fair rental 'n

of the ham of the

parties to the defendant,, The tri a] court fot ind there had been a m ateriaJ change ii: 1 tl le circumstances of the 'parties and ordered the decree
modified to require 'the plaintiff to 'pay $70,00 per month to the defendant.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks the affirmati on of the decision of the trial Oonr*
FACTS
rht,3. im ill Ii ii i'din* I MI I o n 1 hfj» t i f u l m u i i

II|NUI

let e n d a n f

l

Mulu>n t o

Modify the '.Decree of Divorce, entered 'the 29th day of J u l y , 19ft . J*<*e
defendant had previously sought t o modify Hie I^TM-PP at .i In

1

March 31, 1983. At that time the Court declined to modify the decree to
provide for the payment of any amount as defendant's portion of the fair
rental value of the residence until sold as requested by defendant.

Hew-

ever, in making his decision, Judge Sam indicated that at the time the
second mortgage on the heme was retired, the Court would be inclined to
order the payment of the sum of $70.00 per month from the plaintiff to
the defendant based upon changes in the financial and marital status of
the parties. At page 41 of the transcript of that proceeding, the Court
stated:
THE COURT: Let me tell you on that home it appears to me that
the fair rental value as stated is $300.00, she is paying $300.00. I
may, in August $140.00 there on the second mortgage, I may counsel order
$70.00 per month rent payment in August.
MR. PETERSEN:
what to do in August.

Your Honor that would be premature to speculate
We have to look at the situation as it exists

right now.
THE COURT: That is what I am doing.
MR. PETERSEN:

I don't want to make any order.

THE COURT: Let me say I have heard the testimony that the second
mortgage will be paid off in August.

I have heard testimony that the fair

rental value of the heme is $300.00 a month.

She is presently paying

$300.00 a month and in ny judgment there is no requirement to make any
payment to Mr. Petersen based upon the present testimony, but when that
second mortgage is paid it would appear to me that it would be fair and
reasonable since Mr. or Mrs. Jensen is married and her husband is occupying
that home, that $70.00 per month may be fair rental value.
2

MR. PETERSEN: Well, I hope the court is not entering an order to
do that at this time because we must look at the situation now. The fact
thut )roti arm ponnlizinn hor tr r romirryirM

IIP i.. :,.- arried, shi1 bah th

heme.
THE COURT:

1 understand counsel and 1 -an t r y i n g — l i s t e n ,

these

divorce matters a i e I lit' inusl difficult, matte L s I hat t h i s court handles i >£
a l l cases and I am trying my best to make i f a i r and e q u i t a b l e order.
they a r e not fair and e q u i t a b l e ,
t o review my order,

If

p

mu have the Five iudqes u|i ¥1 Mm hi 1 1

I mi s t a t i n g UkiL at t:he present I t does not appeal

t h e r e may be a b a s i s to have him, since the new husband i s occupying t h a t
}

.ill inn 1

H ¥ i

I'M

iF

1 1 Hi 1

I

1 III

1 1 l i til 1 il« ,

'i 1

1 In

I n 11

I*

11 ,i

1

i l ill I I t

H

Now1 if you want t o come back in and r e l i t i g a t e that in August,

payment,

you have that' r i g h t , but
present based

T

-w t e l l i n g you what my observation i s at the

m iiul 1 liaVn heard.

The defendant brought h i s Motion t o Modity|atter the second mort-

submitter

.v

- xhit .

4.

die t r a n

• .ut. *t the March J i ,

LS>8J

proceedings.

The c o u r t found t h a t t h e r e had been a m a t e r i a l chartge of circumstances of
the par t i e s u< it enni eiiiplatBi I -it: th i„e 1 IIIW , h 1,1 if -hi i p u i a t i o n • :::)f the p a r t i es
upon which the decree 'was 'based, in 'the remarriage of the p l a i n t i f f and,, "the
r e t i r i n g of the second mortgage on, the hone reducing" her monthly o b l i g a t i o n .
ARGUMENT
POINT I
j g g w m R QouprpiiWS JUSTIFIED,
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When a decree of divorce is made, the court may make such
orders in relation to the children, property and parties,
and the maintenance of the parties and childrenf as may be
equitable. The court shall have continuing jurisdiction
to make such subsequent changes or new orders with respect
to the support and maintenance of the parties, the custody
of the children and their support and maintenancef or the
distribution of the property as shall be reasonable and
necessary. Visitation right of parents, grandparents and
other relatives shall take into consideration the welfare
of the child. (Emphasis added)
It is clear that the trial court has the statutory authority under
the provisions of the above-cited statute to make subsequent changes or
modifications in the property division where the court deems such a modification to be reasonable and necessary.

Appellant cites several cases to

establish the proposition that in cases of interests in real property,
there is a greater showing of change of circumstances to justify a modification of the decree in reference to said property.

Appellant relies upon

this court1s decision in Foulger vs. Foulger, 626 P.2d 412 (1981)
stating Foulger to be "very much similar" to the present case.

In

fact, Foulger is very different from the facts of the present case.

In

the Foulger case, the lower court modified the parties equity interest
in real property.

In the present case, the modification made by the

trial court did not alter the parties1 respective equity in the real property.

The modification in the present case is more similar to modifi-

cation of a support matter rather than that of a property right.

The

court did not give the respondent any interest in the real property divided
by the decree, but did order payment to the respondent based upon his
previously awarded interest in the property.

This is apparent from reading

Judge Sam's reasoning from the transcript of the March 31, 1983 hearing.
The $70.00 figure is based upon the fifty percent equity interest of the

4

Fun. >

taxt*^(

i*- only circumstances set forth by the respondent

in

nprovements . **. *r*ui. -snt had changed her mind dtout i^avmc

the United States to no s ^ to Germany
of thp *-n*a

i * ••

"• ^ *~ne nrespnt

v*-

-

^«*P«

<

* "<-

^"i^rr T ^ie

. . J - 3e**iO

resulting in a reduction of appellant's monthly expense for the use of the
hone until soltl, r*institute material chanqes of circumsfaiicps whirli nisi i I'v
\ t'M

n 1 ' lOtii i I I lit-

;» IUJ 1 i n M I L u iiiat \ m

The facts of the present case are more akin to those found in

of an order for a monthly mortgage payment.

This cpurt stated at 'page 1300:

Land v s . Land, Utah, 605 P.2d 1248 (1980), held that
perty settlements are entitled to a greater sanctity
than alimony and support payments in proceedings to modify
divorce decrees. However, property settlements are not
sacrosanct and are not beyond the power of a court of
equity to modify. In this case we are not dealing with
the typical distribution of specific assets] pursuant to a
property settlement, but with an order for the payment of
a monthly mortgage obligation. Clearly it Was within the
power of the trial court to modify or eliminate the
'obligation to make those payments if the obviously changed
circumstances under traditional equity standards so required,
;,«- >JM

1-

(also cited nv appellant ^
tr>a

*...-

m^Ification

^

-iv.

n Chandler distinguished Land v s . Land
appellant's bri ef) from'the circumstance if
Lsni lh»; Iistinquished tram the type- ot

'made by the trial court: in the present case.
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POINT II

TEE JUDCMNT OF THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD BE UPHELD UNLESS
THERE IS A SHOWING OF AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
The determination of the trial court in finding a change of circumstances sufficient to require modification of a decree is granted substantial validity by this courtf absent a clear showing or error or abuse
of discretion by the lower court.

In Mitchell vs. Mitchell, 527 P.2d

1359, at 1361, the court stated:

"The determination of the trial court that there has been
a substantial change of circumstances, which justified
the increase of support and maintenance, is presumed valid.
This position was also stated in Christiansen vs. Christiansen, 667 P.2d
592 (1983) wherein the court stated at page 594:
"In our review of divorce and child support proceedings,
this Court accords substantial deference to the trial
court's findings of fact, and accords it considerable
latitude in fashioning appropriate relief.
In the present case, the findings of the lower court set forth the
decision of the court stated specific changes which the court determined to
be material changes justifying the modification made. Those findings
should be presumed valid as the appellant had not demonstrated the findings
to be an abuse of discretion by the lower court. The modification made by
the lower court is consistent with the ownership and equity interest of
the parties in the real property and the lower court should also be given
latitude in that area to equitably adjust the interests of the parties to
reflect the circumstances which presently exist.
LeBreton, 604 P.2d 469.

6

See LeBreton vs.

CONCLUSION
The decision of the lower court to modify the Decree of Divorce in
the manner and fashion done in the present case wap well within the
authority granted the court under the provisions ofc the statutes of the
State of Utah governing powers of the court to retkin jurisdiction to
modify property distribution and support matters ajs well as being within
the restrictions of the case law relevant in this fatter.
Further, the record of the proceedings demonstrates the court
acted within its discretion and its findings should be given deference
and be considered valid. The decision to modify the decree in the
manner in which the court did was within the latitude which the trial
court should be afforded in its attempts to adjust the equities of divorce
matters.
It is respectfully submitted that the decision of the trial court
should be affirmed.
DATED this ^ ( T ^ d a y of October, 1984.
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